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Abstract- Accounts of explanation given in the information
systems literature, most prevalent in the areas knowledge-based
systems and human-computer interaction, generally do not
consider the philosophical underpinnings of explanation
concepts. The theoretically rich accounts that have emerged
from the philosophy of science provide us with a well-developed
framework for designing the structure and content of
explanations to be provided for information systems in
documentation, in help systems, and in embedded explanation
facilities when these are provided. The work described in this
paper is an attempt to draw some of these philosophical ideas
into the realm of information systems by briefly reviewing four
of the major models of explanation from the philosophy of
science literature: deductive-nomological explanation, functional
explanation, rational choice explanation, and pragmatic
explanation. Elements are drawn from each of these models and
are related to their potential utility in the information systems
field. The approach to philosophy of science’s contributions to
information systems explanation is from the perspective of
information systems research and practice, not philosophy, in an
attempt to ‘pull’, not ‘push’, these ideas into the realm of
information systems development and use.
Introduction
Until recently, little of the information systems research
related to explanation has attempted to address the theoretical
underpinnings of what it means to explain. Recent efforts in
the field of explanations for knowledge-based systems have
begun to develop an account of the theoretical foundations of
explanation based on an analysis and integration of empirical
research in the field of explanations for knowledge-based
systems [1], [2]. This paper attempts to provide an additional
theoretical anchor for explanation of information systems,
one based on a selection from the vast body of work in the
philosophy of science, which has addressed problems related
to the structure, content, and purpose of explanations. This is
not an account of the metaphysics of explanation in the
philosophy of information systems science, though this is an
interesting topic in its own right, but an attempt to ground the
notion of explanation, in the information systems use context,
in the relevant philosophical literature.
Explanation as a topic of research in information systems is
generally conducted in the sub-field of knowledge-based
systems, in particular, expert systems, e.g. [1], [2]. This paper
considers explanation in a broader context, as an essential
element of all information systems with purpose being to
meet the information needs of their respective users. In this
sense, explanations are provided by a wide range of
communicatory tools including software analysis and design
documentation, software manuals, integrated help systems,
system training materials, as well as explanation facilities in
knowledge-based systems, decision support systems, and
intelligent tutoring systems.
Norman [3] describes the most significant problem of
human-computer interaction and human-computer
communication as the “Gulf of Understanding” that exists
between the computer’s understanding of the user, and the
user’s understanding of the computer. To address this
problem, a set of questions must be answered to gauge: what
information can be used to fill this gulf, where this
information comes from, how it is structured, how is it to be
communicated, and to identify the major challenges to the
success of the resulting explanation product. Though this
information is typically provided via system documentation
and help facilities, ultimately, attempts to include explanation
facilities in information systems involve engineering human-
computer interaction. An explanation-providing system
embedded within an information system is expected to
contribute to user-system fit and thus to facilitate the user
achieving their activity goals. Computer-generated
explanations are most often applied in two ways: to support
the solution of problems within a well-defined domain, and to
impart an understanding of a given field to those who do not
possess specialized knowledge.
Species of Explanation
The historical and contemporary literature is rich with the
work of philosophers who have struggled with providing a
complete and precise definition of explanation. Most
disciplines include within their corpus attempts to provide a
framework for what constitutes an adequate explanation
within their field [4] [5]. Research in the field of computer-
generated explanation, and information systems in general,
has not, for the most part, referenced this work. Although an
explication of the full range of philosophical and other
theories of explanation is beyond the scope of the paper, this
section will examine a cross-section of the most prevalent
formal theories to help inform the development of a more
well-grounded conceptual framework for the development of
systems capable of generating explanations.
First, an essential point must be made about the distinction
between formal theories of explanation in the philosophy of
science and what counts as an adequate explanation in a
practical, operationalized context. A continuum may be
described between accounts of ‘everyday’ explanation given
in psychology [6] and philosophical accounts of explanation.
Whereas the subtleties of everyday explanations between
people are so complex that we may never achieve the
required level of implicit knowledge recognition in a
computer-based system, the philosophy of science is ‘merely’
concerned with attempts to describe the structure of a best
quality explanation [7]. This paper is an attempt to draw from
some of these descriptions of best-practice explanation.
Among the attributes that are most often related to the notion
of explanation, good explanation or complete explanation in
the philosophy of science are explanatory power, predictive
content, simplicity, and theoretical unification [8]. Friedman
[9] enumerates three essential requirements that a formal
theory of explanation should address:
1. It should be general.
2. It should be objective, it should not rely on the
strength of particular science that is in fashion.
3. The theory should relate explanation to
understanding.
The relationship between formal theories that seek to
develop definitions of ideal or even just good explanations
and what is required in a computer-mediated explanatory
exchange is unclear. This paper sets out to review a selection
of these theories, identify their essential elements, and to then
consider how these elements might relate to the information
needs of IS users.
Deductive-Nomological Explanation
Arguably the most important modern theory of explanation
is Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological (D-N) or Covering Law
Model [10]. Almost all contemporary theories of explanation
stand in relation to this work [11], [12].  The D-N Model
describes explanation as the identification of antecedent
conditions combined deductively with the application of
general laws. Within this model, the explanation equation is
defined as:
Li (general laws)
Ci (antecedent conditions or facts)
______________ (deductively entails)
P (the phenomenon to be explained)
The D-N Model describes causal explanation, the general
laws and antecedent conditions that make up the explanans,
that which does the explaining, are considered to cause the
explanadum, that which is explained. In the D-N Model, an
explanation must fulfil both logical and empirical conditions
of adequacy.
Logical conditions:
R1 The explanadum must be a logical consequence of
the explanans.
R2 The explanans must contain general laws that are
required for the explanandum.
R3 The explanans must be subject to test by experiment
or observation.
Empirical conditions:
R4 The sentences making up the explanans must be
true, that is, highly confirmed by the available
evidence.
Hempel and Oppenheim [10] provide additional metrics for
the effectiveness of explanations that fit their model through
the notion of systematic explanation. They describe
systematic power as contributing to an explanation or
prediction of a theory T as the ratio of the amount of
information derivable by means of T to the amount of initial
information required for that derivation. Their use of the term
systematize refers to the process of constructing explanatory
and predictory relationships between data. The structure of
the covering law model not only defines explanation, but also
suggests why we should value theories that fit the model, that
is, because of their predictive ability [8].
One of the major problems with the D-N Model is the
determination of what counts as a law. Hempel supplies the
following definition.
“By a general law, we shall here understand a statement of
universal conditional form which is capable of being
confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings.”
[5]
In the social sciences, the notion of laws as central to
explanation presents a potential problem given the role of
intentionality in psychology and human behavior [4]. Hempel
allows that law may be too strong a term, for example, in his
discussion of historical analysis, and suggests “universal
hypothesis” as an acceptable substitute. Other problems with
the D-N model include cases where an event fits the model,
but is not explained, and cases where the event is explained
but does not fit the deductive structure of the model. A classic
example of the former is that the length of a shadow does not
explain the height of a flagpole, though the length of the
flagpole, the position of the sun, and the laws of geometry
can be combined into an explanation to fit the D-N model.
A closely related model of explanation is the class of
probabilistic explanations, which attempt to address scenarios
where causal events stand in a probabilistic relation to their
effect or effects. Examples of probabilistic explanations are
often given in medicine, where exposure to an infectious
agent is given as the cause and explanation of someone being
diseased, but not all those exposed to the infectious agent
actually get the disease [12]. Two major versions of
probabilistic explanation are Hempel’s modification of the D-
N Model to account for probabilistic relations, the Inductive-
Statistical or I-S model [13] and Salmon’s Statistical-
Relevance, or S-R model [12].
In contrast to the D-N model, which shows that a given
event occurred with absolute certainty, the I-S model shows
only that given the laws and antecedent conditions, it was
highly probable that the event was to occur [14]. A key
component of the I-S model of explanation is the requirement
for maximal specificity. This requirement holds that an
explanation of the I-S form is invalid unless all statistically
relevant facts are included in the set of antecedent conditions.
For example, an I-S explanation stating that an aircraft of a
certain type with a given amount of fuel had a .9 probability
of travelling over 500 miles would be invalid if the additional
fact that it was flying into a 30 knot headwind was omitted.
A problem that arises in this account and which is
addressed by Salmon [12] in his Statistical-Relevance model,
described below, is that this requirement for maximal
specificity does not take into consideration the relevance of
all of the available facts to the explanation that is provided.
The Statistical-Relevance (S-R) model of explanation exists
on two levels. The first level, statistical relevance, describes
the network or matrix of factors and their associated
probabilities that make up the explanans. The second level
describes the causal force of this array of factors. The S-R
model differs from the I-S model in that it does not include
Hempel’s requirement that the explanandum be highly
probable given the explanans. Salmon’s model instead states
that a given factor is relevant to the explanans if its presence
increases the likelihood of the explanandum event occurring.
For example, the probability of the average person (A)
developing skin cancer (B) is not equal to the probability that
a person who spends five hours each day sunbathing (C) will
develop skin cancer.
D-N Explanation in IS
The major contribution of Hempel’s Deductive-
Nomological model is the role of laws and law-like
statements in the explanation equation. Assuming the less
rigorous definition of such laws, we may admit a range of
facts that can contribute to the explanation of information
system operations including: hardware and software
constraints, published standards, development and user-
interface guidelines well-grounded in empirical studies, laws
in the form of regulatory frameworks that may bound the
development and operation of systems in safety critical
domains, and business rules, for example, accounting
standards and intra/inter-organizational business process
specifications that affect the finished IS product. The
professional, socio-cultural, and organizational standards or
norms in which individuals operate may also be considered a
form of laws or law-like statements. In the context of
information systems development and use, these norms may
act to guide individuals in their work. Considered in this way,
laws take on an importance in the explanation structure in
that they provide a reference structure that helps to answer
questions about design decisions that impacted the system
model.
Technological artifacts such as information systems and
their components have been referred to as objects with a dual
nature: one physical and the other functional [15]. The
physical dimension of information systems may be seen
primarily in the constraints that act upon such a system, for
example hardware, software, and telecommunications
capabilities. A second element of this physical dimension
relates to the ergonomics of a system and its fit with human
psychological and physical capabilities. Unlike many other
engineering disciplines where material constraints play a
major role in the form of the finished artifact, information
systems, especially software, are bound by few such physical
constraints. Logical, intellectual, and social interaction (e.g.
team dynamics) constraints play a far more prominent role in
the shape of the finished IS product.
Many information systems development practices are
driven by the application of standards produced either
internally to guide the development project process and
deliverables, or externally in cases where regulatory
documents play a role in the development process (e.g.
safety-critical systems and systems developed to government
contract specifications). Consider an IS product developed for
the European Community (EC) market and subject to EC
standards related to ergonomics. This sentence consists of the
antecedent conditions, that the software is being developed
for the EC market, and when combined deductively with the
law-like statement that is the EC published ergonomic
standard, we have an explanation of why certain decisions
were made regarding the functionality of the resulting
system.
Hempel [5] argues that explanations in the social sciences
(specifically, history and sociology) often exclude statements
of general laws. They are considered implicit and relate to
individual or social psychology that, it is assumed, are
familiar to the person to whom the explanation is being
given. Though laws may be excluded from the explanation
structure, they can be called upon to add credibility or
justifying grounds to the assertions of the explanation itself
[12]. In this way, laws relate to the design rationale, or
argument structure, which can provide a robust description of
the reasons why a system operates as it does. Design rationale
[16], founded on Toulmin-like argument structures [17], is a
form of system design documentation that attempts to model
the entire design space including all of the design questions
and alternatives considered as well as the criteria applied to
their acceptance or rejection. In a given system design space,
which is structured according to design rationale formalisms,
laws may take the form of a Toulmin warrant backing, where
well-grounded facts (laws) are used as an authoritative guide
in the application of design criteria.
Functional Explanation
Functional explanations attempt to provide arguments for
the existence or persistence of entities (objects, events, or
institutions) by reference to the effects, generally the
beneficial effects, of those entities. Arguments for the validity
of functional explanation are controversial [18] and are
especially prevalent in the fields of biology and in the social
sciences [11]. The attraction of functional explanation,
especially in social science, is based on the assumption that
phenomena must have some meaning, that things exist and
events occur because of their beneficial consequences [19].
Functional explanations are especially relevant to artifacts,
where it is assumed that human design activities and
workmanship are applied to serve some purpose.
Dore [20] has examined the concepts of function and cause
in an attempt to identify ways in which an analysis of
functions can be translated into a statement of causality. In
his analysis he differentiates between the cause of something
(in his example, social institutions) occurring and something
persisting. There is a distinction between the causes of the
events that lead to something being created, and the causes of
the events that lead to something persisting. This analysis
echoes ideas from sociobiology, such as Dawkins’ memes
[21] and Sperber’s cultural cognitive causal chains [22]. Dore
argues that it is possible for causal events to be identified as
functional. Dore’s example involves a discussion of the
development of Chinese communes, stating that it is probably
possible to find the minutes of the meetings and other
documentation of events that led to their creation where the
creation was in constant reference to the intended
consequences of the communes, their function.
Several arguments against the idea of functional
explanation are outlined in [18] and include problems such as
a lack of supporting evidence for the mechanisms by which
certain features or practices exist. Since these are often not
identified, functional explanations are not generally
falisifiable. A second problem he identifies is that functional
explanations do not show how a given feature came to exist,
only how it persists. Against the former, Little [14] argues
that in a complete functional explanation, the causal feedback
process, the missing mechanism highlighted by Kincaid, must
be identified in order for the explanation to be fully coherent.
Against the latter, Little urges us to consider a given feature
in terms of its current effects, not any future effects that the
feature might have. This contributes to the arguments of
teleology that are often raised against the validity of
functional explanations, a feature’s current beneficial effects
are what cause it to persist and to disperse, any beneficial
future effects are an outcome of this persistence and
dispersal.
Functional Explanation in IS
Functional explanations are perhaps most obvious in their
relation to the development of technological artifacts such as
information systems [14]. They are one of Kroes’ [15] two
aspects of technological explanations: the physical and the
functional. Information systems are (usually) developed to
solve a particular problem. Their structure is related to their
end goals and the features and processes the system must
implement in order to achieve these goals. Kroes describes
the design process as that which translates the commercial
requirements for an artifact into a description or blueprint for
its physical structure. During this process the functional
aspects of the artifact are translated into a set of physical
characteristics that will achieve the desired functional, and
therefore commercial, goals. While Kroes claims that there is
little relation between the physical description and the
functional description of the artifact at the end of the design
process, he argues that a complete design must include a
technological explanation which he describes as “an
explanation of the function of a technological object in terms
of the physical structure of that object” [15].
Kroes excludes from his analysis an important element of a
software system design, namely, a logical description of the
artifact as distinct from its physical structure and its
functional description. In a software system design, physical
structure and physical constraints are largely transparent to
the designer (except in cases such as operating systems,
network control software and other device-dependent
systems). Though the designer is likely to employ some
physically determined heuristics during the design process,
for example, minimize disk storage, CPU processing, and
network bandwidth usage, etc., the constraints with the
greatest impact on the software design process are logical.
These logical constraints are in turn determined by a myriad
of factors. The limits of the mind and imagination of the
software designer is one such constraint. This constraint is
compounded in team design processes where communication
of the logical design becomes a constraint [23]. Another
important constraint is the ability of the end user to
understand and effectively use the artifact that results from
the design. Organizational and business factors, in particular
cost, also introduce constraints that become important to a
comprehensive technological explanation of a designed
system.
Rational Choice Explanation
Rational choice theories of explanations are based on work
in economics and attempt to describe an entity’s behavior
(including human behavior) in terms of the perceived benefit
of that behavior relative to other possible behaviors. As
pointed out by Simon [24], such theories of behavior are
simplistic as best given the ambiguities of the beliefs and
desires that purportedly drive rational choice decisions.
Davidson [25] argues that rationalisations, an actor giving
reasons to explain why a particular action was taken, are a
type of causal explanation. In particular, “the primary reason
for an action is its cause”. Central to Davidson’s argument is
the idea that primary reasons express the intention of the
person performing the action. When we give a reason for
taking an action, and the reason is true, we expose the belief
or attitude that is causing the action. Davidson counters
arguments that reasons are not causes of actions by virtue of
their conjunction by appeal to the events that led to the
formation of the beliefs that underlay the reasons. These
beliefs constitute a causal chain, events lead to belief
formation, these beliefs, now given as reasons, cause an actor
to take particular actions.
In reference to the baseline D-N model of explanation,
Davidson allows that causal explanations based on reasons do
not necessarily refer to laws (he prefers the weaker claim that
causal explanations involve laws rather than entail them) nor
are they necessarily purely deductive. Competing beliefs that
impact choice of action in a given scenario are selected based
on a weighting that is not necessarily predictable or even
reliably describable, and the laws that affect a given reason
may be so far removed from the belief as to be irrelevant to
the explanation.
Rational Choice Explanation in IS
Despite the problematic nature of rational choice theories
of explanation, individuals and organizations do, sometimes,
make decisions based on their perceptions of the relative
value of the potential outcomes. In an information systems
development context, a vast array of interconnected and
sometimes competing beliefs and desires may interact in the
course of a given design decision. Capturing the elements of
such an array is probably impossible given the shear number
of them that may be present in a group decision context and
the fact that many or even most are tacit, inaccessible even to
the individual who holds them [26]. Nonetheless, not all
decisions are this complex and the primary decision factors
can be made explicit within the normal functioning of an
information systems development team. In such cases,
rational choice explanations do fill a gap in the information
systems explanation equation by allowing for the goal
maximizing behavior, however simplified by constraints of
access and capture, of the individuals as they work in teams.
Pragmatic Explanation
Pragmatic theories frame explanation as “an interest-
relative notion” [27]. One of the most vociferous proponent
of pragmatic accounts of explanation is Bas van Fraassen
[28], [29]. His view is that explanation is best viewed as
answering a given why-question from a particular aspect
within a particular context. Van Fraassen claims that in
answer to the question “why is the light on”, both “because I
flipped the switch” and “because we are expecting company”
are both explanations, depending on the rationale for the
original question. To van Fraassen [29],
“Which factors are explanatory is not decided by features
of the scientific theory but by concerns brought from
outside.”
He offers a foil to the hypothetical question in which it is
asked whether the length of a shadow explains the height of a
pole, most would answer that indeed it does not. However, in
van Fraassen’s example, the length of the shadow does
explain the height of the pole, if the pole is a pointer on a
sundial with the desired property that it cast a shadow of a
given length. Van Fraassen argues against the idea that
explanations can be conceptually analyzed or evaluated based
on innate notions such as simplicity, predictive strength,
truth, or empirical adequacy that deny the role of context.
Van Fraassen also argues for the centrality of contrast
classes and relevance relations in explanation constructions.
Contrast classes provide information on why a particular
event occurred instead of or in relation to another in its
contrast class [8]. In contrast to the similarly named concept
employed in Salmon’s S-R model, van Fraassen’s relevance
relation describes events that relate to the event to be
explained in terms of the relevance of those events to the
purposes of the explanation.
Pragmatic Explanation in IS
One of the most significant problems with explanatory
dialogues between humans and machines is the machine’s
inability to establish the background knowledge possessed by
the human user. A key component of human-to-human
explanation is that people are able to quickly establish at least
a portion of this background knowledge and apply it to the
construction of an explanation [30]. Antaki [31] argues that
the single most important aspect of an explanation given by
an intelligent system is that it be believable. He suggests that
in order to be believable, a system providing an explanation
must know what the user does not know, know what the user
wants to know, know why the user wants to know it, and
know what the user will accept as an explanation.
Researchers have attempted to address these explanation
dialogue and credibility issues through user modeling and
attempts to refine the dialogue management capabilities of
explanation facilities, e.g. [32] [33]. Though some successes
have been achieved in the laboratory, little of this work has
been adopted as standard industry practice.
A large proportion of research into computer-generated
explanation consists of attempts to meet the challenges of
providing interest-relative explanations to end-users with
different backgrounds, skills, and knowledge states. These
efforts represent an attempt to get to the heart of the human-
to-human explanation problem. Though pragmatic theories of
explanation highlight the importance of audience and context
in any account of explanation, the problems inherent in
attempting to approximate human expertise in explanation
provision suggest that rather than attempting to mimic
human, researchers in computer-generated explanation should
consider redirecting their efforts such that the strengths of
computers and software systems are best leveraged. As
Gregor and Benbasat [1] point out, established theories
related to cognitive effort suggest that users of an information
system will not use explanation facilities unless they perceive
the cost of retrieving and processing these explanations to be
outweighed by the benefits. Here, the importance of the
‘relevance relation’ as described by van Fraassen and Salmon
becomes critical. Established models of computer system
documentation suggest that users of information systems
make parsimonious use of computer system documentation
[34]. They seek out information that will assist them in
achieving their immediate aims, and quickly give up their
search if they do not succeed quickly, preferring instead to
explore the systems functionality until they are able to
achieve the desired end.
The idea that contrast classes, or what could have been
rather than what is, is one of the central points in van
Fraassen’s account of explanation [28]. Contrast classes are
used in explanation to vector a concept in relation to its
possible alternatives. Providing an account of why a system
feature or process was implemented in a certain way is
possibly best expressed in terms of the alternatives and the
reasons why they were not selected for implementation.
Again, this account bears a close resemblance to the design
rationale-based model of system documentation where not
only are the end products of design decisions captured, but all
of the options considered in the process.
The problem providing a computer system with the ability
to recognize context has been highlighted in the literature,
perhaps most effectively by Dennett’s paper, which described
the now famous Frame Problem [35].  This problem can be
somewhat mitigated by providing explanations in a format in
which the explanation user has control of the information that
they extract based on their own knowledge of context rather
than the system’s. One established way of presenting
information in this way is through hypertext, where
information is organized into categorized ‘trees’ that present
information in successive levels of detail and allow branching
based on immediate information needs. Information
structured in this way allows users of information systems to
make their own selections based on relevance to current
information needs.
Despite the intuitive attraction of providing for the
pragmatics of explanation delivery, significant problems exist
in achieving this goal. Research into user modeling may yet
uncover ways of finessing explanatory dialogue in the
systems context [32], [33], but significant barriers to this goal
remain. In the user modeling area, the level of complexity
involved in classifying users according to some system-use
related criteria presents a daunting challenge [36] and some
researchers even question the desirability and ethics of
capturing the amount of personal information required for the
task [37].
Discussion
A recent and well-developed account of the nature of
explanation in knowledge-based information systems is [1].
In this account, the authors survey the field of explanation in
knowledge-based systems and relate explanation facility
implementations to theories of cognitive effort, cognitive
learning, and Toulmin argument structures. The focus of their
work is on the desirability of explanations in intelligent
systems, the benefits that accrue to users of these systems
when explanations are provided, and the types of
explanations that are most useful in the context of human-
computer interaction. Explanatory content is one element of
explanation type that they identify and they provide a
taxonomy of explanation content types which includes:
1. Trace or line of reasoning content
2. Justification or support content
3. Control or strategic content
4. Terminological content
This taxonomy was derived from the explanation in
knowledge-based systems literature and is a useful
framework to apply when considering the nature of
explanatory content in the information systems context.
However, the thesis of the current paper is that explanation
content may be considered from a different, more basic
perspective, one derived from the body of work on theory of
explanation in the philosophy of science. The motivation for
this review is to provide additional theoretical grounding for
our efforts at improving user understanding of system design
and functionality with the end goal being a contribution to
improved human-computer interaction.
The role of causality is considered first given its
prominence in the philosophical literature. According to
Clancey [38] “causal links” are the most interesting and
difficult to explicate components of a system (in this case, an
expert system) since they are related to the underlying
processes of the application. Causal links in the context of IS
use refer not only to the technical causal chains, i.e. inter-
modular and inter-application functionality, but to the
complexities inherent in the development of designed
artifacts within a social and organisational framework.
Whether a given system, feature, or process is ‘caused’ by
application of a law, by the need to implement a given
functionality, or by goal-maximizing behavior on the part of
members of the development team or their user community,
all of the explanation models discussed here, with the
exception of the pragmatic theory, have a fixed causal basis.
In the case of the pragmatic theory, the explanation may be
causal but the depth of the given cause is determined only by
the goals of the explanation giver in the context of a given
explanation request.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus [39] argue that in order to explain
how something works, it must first be broken down into the
particle level, the component level, and the functional level.
This mechanistic, reductionist approach to explanation
structure involves showing how a device’s components add
up to produce the functioning of the whole device. This view
of explanation is in contrast to the holistic model. Holistic
accounts apply to information systems in cases such as
functional or pragmatic explanations where the purpose of the
system being explained or the purpose of the explanation
itself, overrides the utility of knowing about causal
interaction of parts. In the field of AI many expert system
researchers have argued that for a system to provide
sufficient explanations, it must include knowledge of first
principles in its application domain [40]. These first
principles constitute the “ultimate explanations” upon which
an explanation system must rely and relate closely to the laws
and law-like statements required by Hempel.
Based on this explication of a selection of formal theories
of explanation from the philosophy of science, a set of
principles may be derived to contribute to a conceptual
framework for evaluation of explanations and explanation-
generation technologies in information systems. This
selection consists of the following explanation elements:




Relating design decisions to established
facts including physical laws, standards,
norms, and other reasonably well
established universals.
Contrast Classes Relating design decisions to options that
were not adopted, to what could have
been rather than what is.
Relevance Relations Limiting the explanation to elements with
direct relevance to the system feature of
interest. In an information retrieval
context, such relevance relations may be
defined through a probabilistic function.
Rational Choices Showing how the development team and
other interested stakeholders affected the
form of the system based on their beliefs
and desires, which may themselves relate
to other explanatory elements.
Functional Purpose Relating system design decisions to the
motivation for the system and its
individual features and processes, i.e. the
purpose they are meant to serve in the
system and domain context.
Information systems are designed and
developed to support users as they
perform tasks in an application domain
within an organizational and social
context. Explanations of information
systems and their features should help
users relate design decisions to the
underlying motives behind these




Help to maintain parsimony in
explanation delivery by accounting, as
much as possible, for the reasons for the
explanation request and interests of the
explanation user.
Consider the context in which an
explanation is provided and map
explanatory content to the tasks and goals
of the information system user.
Each of these elements contributes something unique and
necessary to a complete, best practice explanation of an
information system, a feature, or an information
transformation process. Explanations of this level of
sophistication and detail are necessary given the complexity
of the information systems development and use context.
They also contribute to the tractability of information
necessary for systems that attempt to include explanation-
generation capabilities.
Experts who do not possess the ability to draw on a base of
increasingly detailed and experiential information in the
course of providing an explanation are frequently the subject
of credibility problems, especially in safety-critical domains
or those that are considered to have a rich, intellectual content
[41]. In order to successfully explain a concept at some level
of expertise, a clear model of the domain knowledge and a
rigorous understanding of the problem solving process is
necessary [42]. By drawing on established laws or their
empirically well-grounded equivalents in a given field, we
help to establish this credibility in the explanations that we
provide.
Conclusion
As human-designed artifacts that emerge from a complex
socio-technical, organizational, and psychological context,
information systems are subject to the web of decision
making that characterizes the artificial. In the design of an
information system, we hope that this web consists of a series
of rational decisions made with an eye to the desired
functionality of the resulting artifact and the extent to which
it achieves a good fit with the work context and task structure
of the target user community. However, the very complexity
of this web results in information needs that are rarely met in
the context of information systems development and use.
This framework may be further developed, especially
within the pragmatics of explanation delivery area, by
referencing work in psychology related to theories of
everyday explanation [6]. However, before the details of
explanation delivery are finessed, we require a rich,
theoretically grounded framework to describe the basic
elements of explanation and their purpose in the explanation
equation. Without such a framework, we are left with little in
the way of fundamental, conceptually rigorous criteria for the
evaluation of the explications we provide for our information
systems products.
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